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Military intervention by external forces in both the DRC and Lesotho has aroused  
curiosity' among the reg ion 's political observers regarding the preparedness and  
capability o f regional states to evolve constructive conflict resolution mechanisms. 
This article compares the DRC and Lesotho and notes that although the roots and 
nature o f the conflict in both countries are different, external military intervention 
formed part o f  its resolution. The paper concludes that there is need to prom ote  
and  strengthen internal mechanisms o f  conflict management.
Introduct ion
There has been a lot o f  debate about the intervention o f Southern African 
Development Community (SADC) troops in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo (DRC) and in Lesotho. The confusion over these interventions 
results mainly from the lack o f  a clear definition o f  the role o f  the post­
apartheid SADC and lack o f clarity over the conditions and mechanisms o f 
military intervention by SADC troops in situations o f crisis. As a result, 
much of the discussion o f these crises has been devoted to assessing the 
legality of the intervention o f South Africa and Botswana in Lesotho, on the 
one hand, and that of Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia in the Congo, on the 
other hand. Critics have also tried to identify the respective interests of 
these external actors in order to grasp their motivations for intervening in 
the embattled countries.
This paper attempts to look at these violent conflicts from the perspective 
of the internal actors, both armed and unarmed, given that lasting stability 
in these countries depends essentially on the commitment o f  these internal 
actors to end or to continue the hostilities.
Denis Kadima is a Researcher at the Electoral Institute of South 
Africa, Johannesburg, RSA.
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The DRC Crisis
The advent o f  Laurent Kabila and his Alliance o f Democratic Forces for the 
Liberation o f  Congo (AFDL) on 17 May 1997 opened an era o f  hope for 
the country and the region as a whole. However, contradictions within the 
AFDL and ill-managed conflicts between Kabila and his former Rwadan 
and Ugandan allies, led, on 2 August 1998, to the eruption o f  new 
hostilities in the Congo. Led by ethnic Tutsi elements in alliance with 
former dignitaries o f  the Mobutu regime, and fully supported by the armies 
of Rwanda and Uganda, the Rassemblement Congolais pou la Democratie 
(RCD) has vowed to oust President Kabila by violent means. It has been 
alleged that the Tutsi-dominated Burundian army has also joined the rebel 
coalition.
The Congolese president is being supported militarily by three SADC 
countries, namely Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe. These countries were 
joined later by Chad, a non-SADC member. There are unconfirmed reports 
that Kabila is also enjoying the support of the Sudanese army. In addition, 
the Forces Armees Congolaises (FAC) o f President Kabila are being 
assisted by the so-called “ independent allies” . These are made up of 
foreign and domestic unlawful armed groups having their own long-term 
military and political objectives. The most important among these 
unofficial armed groups are the Hutu-dominated former Forces Armees 
Rwandaises (FAR) and the Interahamwe, the Hutu militialleged to have 
organised and executed the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. The domestic 
“ independent ally” supporting Kabila is the Mai Mai, a militia composed 
o f elements from Eastern Congo’s indigenous tribes whose raison d ’etre is 
to resist what they call the Tutsi expansionist agenda.
In brief, there are about 20 distinct armed groups, both lawful and unlawful, 
operating in the DRC.
Efforts currently undertaken by the United-Nations (UN) and the 
Organisation African Unity (OAU) mainly through President Frederick 
Chiluba o f Zambia, which focus on convincing the armed factions to agree 
to a cease-fire prior to negotiations, have failed to bring about a political 
settlement. After six months o f war, peace negotiators have not succeeded 
in bringing the warring factions to the negotiating table. This should 
stimulate peacemakers to further reflect on the causes and real motivations
Lesotho Social Science Review Vol. 5 No. 1 67
of the protagonists in order to grasp the dynamics of the conflict. Only then 
would they be able to contribute meaningfully to the establishment o f  a 
lasting solution.
AFDL and RCD’s doubtful commitment to democratic transformation
A few actions by both the Kabila administration and the RCD rebels have 
prompted serious scepticism about their respective commitment to future 
political pluralism. The Congolese government is responsible for the 
systematic exclusion o f the political opposition, creating the grounds for 
armed insurrection. Many decisions o f  the AFDL have exposed its 
exclusionist tendencies. These include the suspension of the constitution 
and the existing institutions on coming to power; the ban on political 
activities, except for the ruling party, the AFDL; and the establishment of 
military courts competent to sentence any person involved in political 
activities other than those organised by the AFDL.
The conferring o f nearly absolute power upon President Kabila who, as a 
result, is vested with all executive, legislative, military and financial powers 
leaves considerable room for the abuse o f power by the incumbent regime. 
This concentration o f powers has allowed the AFDL administration 
arbitrarily to exclude political opponents from the political arena. Thus, in 
March 1998 the unilaterally created constitutional commission established 
and inserted in the appendix o f the draft constitution a list of political rivals 
who would not be allowed to run for office. They are suspected o f  having 
participated in political crimes and economic mismanagement while the 
previous regimes held power.
Furthermore, the head o f state has passed a law regulating the highly 
sensitive issue o f nationality. The major stakeholders, and particularly the 
eastern Congo communities who are the victims o f the ethnic 
confrontations resulting from the inconsistencies o f the nationality law, 
have not been consulted. This confirms once more that unscrupulous 
politicians have been aggravating ethnic cleavages to advance their own 
political agendas.
The unilateralist tendency o f the Kabila regime further manifested itsell 
when the state president passed the law on political parties and platforms 
and the 28 February 1999 decree setting the basic rules for the national
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constitutional debate. This law contains unnecessary restrictive conditions 
on the creation and functioning o f  parties and political platforms. The 1999 
decree limits the participants in the national constitutional debate to the 
government, the judiciary, civil society groups, and the Diaspora and 
ignores the internal political opposition as well as the rebel forces that 
control nearly half ofthe national territory. The Kinshasa government has 
also been criticised for the frequent arrest o f  political opponents and 
journalists, as well as the use o f  degrading corporal punishments against 
“undisciplined” civilians, particularly during the early stage o f the AFDL 
take-over.
The most blatant violation o f human rights occurred during the first weeks 
o f  the rebellion. Indeed the Kinshasa government then orchestrated an 
extensive national campaign of hatred against the ethnic Tutsis. It has been 
alleged that the army was responsible for the killing o f  Tutsi civilians 
throughout the country and the expropriation o f their properties.
As for the RCD rebels, most o f  them were in the AFDL government until 
the eruption o f hostilities in August 1998. They were supporters, if not 
initiators, o f  the new administration’s move towards personal rule. Some 
defended publicly many o f the above decisions by the AFDL government, 
claiming that they were needed to restore discipline, law and order in the 
country after 32 years o f  Mobutism. It must be recalled that shortly after 
the AFDL’s take-over, Bizima Kahara, then Minister o f  Foreign Affairs and 
today the real leader o f the RCD rebellion, declared that democratisation 
was net on the agenda for the Congo. It was only when a number o f AFDL 
leaders, including Kahara himself, lost their influence over President Kabila 
and felt threatened by him that they suddenly became vocal for his removal 
from office by violent means, accusing him of not being prepared to 
introduce democracy and the rule o f  law.
While aspiring to play a leading role in the Congo, the Tutsis who 
constitute the most powerful politico-military component in the RCD 
rebellion, appear unable to accommodate a broader constituency beyond 
their narrow tribal group. They have so far failed to reach out to credible, 
independent-minded and representative Congolese leaders from groups 
other than their own. As a result, most Congolese tend to consider that the 
ethnic Tutsis are fighting their own war aimed both at obtaining the 
recognition o f their Congolese nationality and at enjoying the lion’s share
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of power and other advantages associated with it. Furthermore, their 
association with the former barons o f the Mobutu regime, who are sadly 
renowned for their mismanagement and kleptomaniac tendencies, is 
perceived as an additional proof that Tutsi leaders are only interested in 
acquiring power at all costs, regardless o f  their partners’ unethical and 
selfish interests.
Mobutuist forces, another major component o f the RCD rebellion, have the 
hard task of demonstrating that they support democracy. For most critics, 
they have joined the war in order to re-conquer the power they lost two 
years ago. Reports on corruption in the rebel movement abound. In 
January 1999, dissatisfied members o f  the RCD alleged that certain 
Mobutuist elements are involved in the fraudulent granting o f  permits for 
the exploitation and trading o f  diamonds and gold in the rebel held region.
The argument that the rebellion does not seek democracy was echoed in late 
January 1999 by the former Vice-President o f  the rebellion movement 
himself, Arthur Z ’Ahidi Ngoma, who resigned, accusing th^m ovem ent o f 
not being representative o f  the Congolese. He also blamed his former 
colleagues in the RCD for not being interested in the establishment o f  a 
genuine democracy in Congo.
In addition, the report o f  18 September 1998 by the Congolese non­
governmental organisation Groupe Justice et Liberation, blamed both RCD 
rebels and Congolese governmental troops for massive human rights abuses 
and the illegal expropriations o f property in Kisangani and the surrounding 
areas (Groupe Justice et liberation, 1998). A report by the Catholic Church 
has revealed massive massacres o f  civilians, women and children by the 
ethnic Tutsi rebels in the South Kivu province. These two reports were 
corroborated by the findings o f Roberton Garreton, the United Nations’ 
rapporteur on human rights in the Congo, after visiting the eastern Congo 
during the second half o f  February 1999. Garreton expressed concern 
about the situation in eastern Congo, where political parties are not allowed 
and the press is not free. In a more recent communication with the media, 
Garreton accused RCD rebel forces and their Rwandan and Ugandan allies 
of cruelly massacring civilians and enforcing a reign o f  terror that is far 
worse than the abuses committed by the Government o f  the DRC. 
Describing the rebel prisons, he said “some are genuine torture centers and 
many are extermination centers. The persons held in the centers are
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regularly tortured and the women are sexually abused”. (Internet, March 
30, 1999).
There is little doubt that both the AFDL government and the RCD rebels 
have still to prove that they are really committed to democratic 
transformation. The fact that both movements’ appellations contain the 
word “democracy” or the adjective “democratic” is not sufficient. This 
seems to be a mere window dressing.
Little is known about the Mouvement pour la Liberation du Congo (MLC), 
the second rebel movement, so far confined to the Equateur and Oriental 
provinces. The leader o f  the MLC, Jean-Pierre Bemba, has admitted that 
his movement was supported by President Yoweri Museveni o f Uganda.
The other internal actors in the DRC are the non-violent opposition and 
civil society. Both structures have been excluded from all the talks. These 
groups consider the current war as an internal power struggle opposing 
current and former elements o f  the AFDL and their respective allies, and 
that the governments o f  Rwanda and Uganda have exploited this conflict 
to advance their hegemonic agendas. For these non-violent organisations, 
the military victory of one side is undesirable as the winning factions would 
exclude the losers and all the other groups just as happened after the AFDL 
defeated Mobutu’s poorly paid soldiers. And this will create the grounds 
for emergence o f another rebellion.
The attitude of the international community and SADC leaders is worrying. 
They should be aware o f the long-term danger o f  listening exclusively to 
the armed groups and ignoring the voices o f  credible and representative 
leaders o f  the non-violent political opposition and civil society. By doing 
so, are they not setting a precedent by legitimising armed insurrection at the 
expense o f peaceful opposition, as the most effective means for whoever 
wants to be listened to? Would this not encourage the emergence of more 
armed oppositions in the region?
The argument for the inclusion o f  the leaders o f  the non-violent internal 
opposition and civil society, I should not suggest that all o f  them are 
credible. Only those who are sufficiently representative o f  their respective 
constituencies and have demonstrated credibility, honesty and a strong 
commitment to democracy, peace and development should be considered
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as valuable partners in future peace talks.
The Congolese Political Elite and its Fear o f Elections
This paper argues that efforts must be pursued to convince the fighting 
parties to meet at the negotiating table, to which significant non-violent 
internal forces should also be invited as equal peace partners. At the same 
time, it draws the attention o f the negotiators to the fact that they must 
avoid the mistakes o f  the past when such meetings were used by 
unscrupulous politicians as springboards to acquire or maintain power. It 
is worth recalling that since the early nineties all means, including unethical 
ones, were used to acquire entry to the sphere o f  power. Those who had 
failed to be appointed ministers would eventually “fabricate” fresh political 
crises, hoping to be luckier in the subsequent cabinet reshuffle aimed at 
ending the “crisis”. The late president Mobutu himself was a champion o f 
“fabricated” crises, created to get rid of opponents or to appoint courtesans. 
As a result o f  both real and unreal crises, democratic transformation has 
become an unreachable dream for the Congolese. The prolonged political 
impasse has thus profited to this non-elected political elite. As a result, 
nine years after the beginning of the democratic transition the DRC is ruled 
by its umpteenth “transitional government”.
This elitist thinking has been reinforced by the opportunities created by the 
AFDL war. Congolese adventurers from the European, American and 
African Diaspora, most o f  whom having little qualifications and 
professional experience, joined the 1996-1997 rebellion in Goma in eastern 
Congo during the early hours o f  the insurrection. Many have managed to 
be appointed cabinet members and to other powerful positions thanks to 
their “courage” rather than their expertise. Following the same elitist logic, 
after having lost power to the benefit o f  Kabila’s AFDL, M obutu’s former 
courtesans are financing a fresh war in the Congo with their ill-gotten 
money in order to re-enter the corridors o f  power. This is done in 
partnership with the same Rwandan and Ugandan troops who pushed them 
out of power two years ago.
Kabila having set the example, power-thirsty citizens have understood that 
the easiest way to advance their interests is to ensure they coincide with the 
strategic and economic interests o f  some of the Congo’s neighbours. In 
fact, there is no doubt that Rwanda and Uganda have real and legitimate
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security concerns which, to some extent, explain their sending o f  troops to 
the Congo. However, it must he recognised that the political and military 
leadership o f these countries is finding this war very profitable. It is not 
surprising that many do not wish to see the crisis come to an end. 
Museveni and his family are said to control the diamond centre in 
Kisangani, while the Ugandan military are reported to be involved in the 
traffic o f  the Congo’s timber and diamonds. The Ugandan parliament has 
complained about this predatory behaviour several times. As for the 
Rwandan politico-military leadership, they are organising daily looting in 
the eastern Congo, as well as trafficking in gold, diamonds and other 
natural resources. Some reports indicate that Congolese plants and factories 
are dismantled and then assembled in Rwanda, rendering the eastern Congo 
dependent on Rwanda for what it used to produce locally.
Given the above, it would be interesting to answer some questions, such as:
Is the crisis about democracy, human rights, peace and security, or 
is it just about who should controT the Congo’s natural resources?
How can negotiations serve exclusively the search for democracy, 
human rights, peace, security and stability without being abused by 
malicious politicians as a mere tactic for acquiring or maintaining 
power?
The central argument of this section is that there is undoubtedly a need for 
talks amongst all the Congolese parties, on the one hand, and between the 
Congo as a sovereign country and its neighbours, on the other hand. The 
talks amongst the Congolese should be aimed at finding lasting solutions 
to this multidimensional crisis, rather than being abused by politicians as 
a springboard to achieve personal political ambitions. One o f the aims of 
such direct talks would be to get the Congolese government, the rebels and 
credible and representative leaders of the internal political opposition and 
civil society, to approve and genuinely support the deployment of impartial 
and well-trained peacekeeping forces between the belligerents.
It is worth remembering that the hatred between parties and communities 
in conflict, as well as the alleged massacres o f  civilians by both sides, will 
not make the restoration o f trust easy. In fact, the victims o f  human rights 
violations will not forget their condition just because a peace accord has
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been signed by a handful o f  negotiators in remote air-conditioned offices 
in Lusaka, Windhoek or Pretoria. The accord should be accompanied by 
extensive civic education campaigns and reconciliatory programmes at the 
grassroots levels. And most o f  this effort will naturally come from local 
civil society groups and trusted political leaders, as they have a better 
understanding o f the issues and the terrain. Therefore, the resolution o f the 
conflict in the Congo should involve not only the fighting factions but also 
non-violent political parties and civil society. These internal actors should 
be involved in the talks from the early stages. Otherwise the SADC leaders 
would, perhaps unintentionally, be legitimising the use o f violence as the 
preferred means to achieve the recognition of one’s cause.
The formation of an inclusive government of national unity should follow 
such talks. The duration o f such a government should be kept deliberately 
short (i.e. not exceed 6 months). In order to keep its tasks simple and 
achievable, the mission o f the transitional government would be confined
to:
facilitating the organisation o f  inclusive, transparent, free and fair 
elections at national, provincial and local levels within a period of 
time not exceeding its tenure o f  office;
designing electoral laws and process as to ensure that the 
expectations of the majority are acknowledged without ignoring the 
fears o f  significant minorities; and
creating a national republican police and army whose respective 
tasks will be the restoration o f law and order, the protection o f  the 
national territory against foreign aggressions and the prevention of 
rebels groups operating from the Congolese territory to destabilise 
its neighbours.
While pursuing these objectives, the transitional government will also deal 
with the traditional tasks o f all governments, such as the provision of 
health, education and justice. However, its highest priorities should be the 
installation o f an elected leadership and the restoration o f internal and 
external security.
There is bound to be controversy over the duration o f  such a transitional
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government and the scope o f its mission. Some would argue that it would 
be better to appoint a government for a longer transitional period (e.g. 2 
years) so that it should deal with other important matters, such the 
restoration o f the infrastructure, which is of primordial importance for 
better electoral operations.
Every country must learn from its experience and those o f others. No 
government in today’s DRC has the resources and ability to build or restore 
the Congo’s degraded infrastructures within a short-term period. 
International lenders and aid agencies are reluctant to make medium and 
long-term deals with transitional governments. Moreover, deprivation in 
today’s Congo would not allow the government to raise sufficient funds 
domestically. In addition, as the country’s recent political history shows, 
in the new DRC like in the former Zaire, an entire year has never passed 
without a major sociopolitical or military conflict. If the negotiating parties 
opt for a longer transitional period, there would probably be another major 
crisis in the country before the completion o f such a period. Political 
troublemakers would have sufficient time to engineer a “crisis” that would 
ensure their own political survival by prolonging the transition. It is 
particularly those politicians who are conscious that they have no future in 
the context o f  electoral democracy, given their lack o f broader support 
among the electorate, who are likely to be guilty o f  such conduct.
In addition, the DRC can learn from the example o f Angola. After several 
decades of devastating war, which has left this neighbouring country with 
destroyed roads and railways, an obsolete telephone network, and millions 
o f life-threatening landmines, Angola managed to hold elections in 
September 1992, relying mainly on air transport provided by the UN. The 
subsequent electoral dispute was not a result o f  the poor state o f  the 
country’s infrastructure but rather the controversy surrounding the election 
outcome. In order to efficiently organise general elections, the DRC 
transitional government could also secure logistical, material and financial 
support from the UN and other donors, and thus, surmount the obstacle 
posed by its destroyed infrastructure.
To conclude with the Congolese case, it must be pointed out that at the 
moment, the fighting factions, with their supporters, are claiming to have 
the best interests of the Congolese people at heart. The only way for them 
to demonstrate their respect for the Congolese population and their
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commitment to democratic values, is by providing the people o f  the Congo 
with the opportunity to choose by themselves their representatives without 
further delay. The proposed approach would help entrench the culture o f 
acceding to power through the ballot and not the bullet.
The Lesotho Crisis
I was one o f the international observers o f the Lesotho May 1998 
parliamentary election where 1 visited 19 polling stations on the election 
day. It must be mentioned that the electoral operation, from the opening of 
the polling stations to the announcement o f  the results, was peaceful, 
transparent, free and fair, at least in the voting stations that were visited. 
Thus, the Lesotho post-electoral crisis came as a big surprise to many 
foreign observers, given their limited understanding o f Lesotho’s history 
and the nature and extent o f the successive political crises.
Brief Overv iew o f Lesotho’s Post-Independence Political History
The post-independence political history o f the Kingdom of Lesotho has 
been characterised by frequent political instability resulting from disputes 
over electoral results. Thus, when, in 1965, the progressive Basutoland 
Congress Party (BCP surprisingly lost the first parliamentary general 
elections by a small margin to the conservative Basutoland National Party 
(BNP), it was alleged that the elections had been rigged. The losing party 
did not accept the election outcome.
Afterwards, the BCP started to prepare itself systematically for the January 
1970 general elections, which it won eventually, though the official results 
were withheld by the government. Indeed, Leabua Jonathan’s ruling BNP 
refused to acknowledge its defeat, cancelled the electoral results and 
established a single-party system that lasted until 1986, when the military 
organised a coup d ’etat against the government and installed a military 
dictatorship until 1993. The period between 1970 and 1993 was, then, a 
serious setback to the entrenchment o f  a democratic culture in the 
Kingdom.
However, the gradual transformation o f most Southern African regimes and 
South Africa’s apartheid system from the late 1980's, as well as internal and 
external pressures upon the Lesotho military leadership, compelled the
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military to relinquish power to the civilians through the holding o f election. 
In 1993 Lesotho held its first multiparty election in 23 years. The BCP won 
all the 65 seats, becoming a de facto single-party. According to Southall 
“ ... the voters imposed a heavy punishment upon the BNP for having 
subjected them to its dictatorship” (1999:21).
Once more, the electoral results were disputed. The BNP challenged the 
outcome of the election through the court but its allegations o f  electoral 
fraud could not be substantiated. It therefore lost the case.
Shortly after acceding to power, the BCP found itself embroiled in an 
internal power struggle which weakened the party affecting adversely its 
ability to deliver on its electoral promises. In addition, the BCP 
government found itself in conflict with the monarchy and the army. This 
eventually led to its month-long dismissal by the King in August 1994. The 
ruling party recovered its prerogatives only after intensive mediation by 
South Africa, Zimbabwe and Botswana. Subsequently, the conflict within 
the BCP grew and led to the party splitting into two fiercely opposed 
factions. The then Prime Minister, the Jete Ntsu Mokhehle and his splinter 
group, called the Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LCD), counted the 
majority of seats in parliament, reducing the elected BCP to a mere official 
opposition. The BCP protested to no avail,, calling upon the King to 
dissolve the LCD-dominated parliament and appoint a government of 
national unity prior to the holding of fresh elections. This tense atmosphere 
prevailed until the eve of the May 1998 election.
The political context just before the 1998 elections, as described by 
Matlosa, explains the crisis that occurred a few days after the 
announcement o f  the election outcome.
“ A s the [M ay 1998] election  date drew  closer, the political b itterness 
am ong the contestants becam e more and more pronounced. The anim osity 
and the rivalry were real as the opposition parties aim ed to either dislodge 
or destabilise the LCD governm ent through both parliam entary  and extra- 
parliam entary  m eans. Extra parliam entary  pressure w as relaxed as the 
e lec tion  approached w ith the assum ption  that the new ly form ed LCD 
w ould be defeated (my em phasis)” ( 1999a: 16).
Thus, when international election observers arrived in Lesotho, most failed 
to notice the tensions given that opposition parties had suspended extra­
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parliamentary demonstrations, as explained above. As a result, the havoc 
that followed the announcement o f the 1998 election outcome came as a 
shock.
The Exclusionist Character o f the Current Lesotho Electoral System
The Lesotho 1998 election was won by the ruling party by an 
overwhelming majority. Indeed, the Lesotho Congress for Democracy 
(LCD) won 79 out of 80 constituencies. However, when one looks at these 
results in terms o f the percentage o f votes received by the contesting parties 
and candidates, one discovers that the winning party received just over 60 
per cent of  votes cast, while the losing parties received the remaining 40 per 
cent. In other words, for having received 60 per cent o f  the votes cats, the 
LCD was entitled to nearly 98 per cent o f  the parliamentary seats while the 
opposition and independent candidates, in spite o f  their 40 per cent o f  the 
votes, were entitled to only 2 per cent o f  the seats in parliament.
In addition, although the LCD received the majority o f votes in all but one 
constituency, namely Bobatsi, the percentage of.votes cast in its favour 
ranged from 81 per cent in Thaba-Phechela to only 29 per cent in 
Mokhotlong, where it beat all three o f the main opposition parties by 
narrow margins.
The First-Past-The-Post (FPTP) system denied the losing parties fair 
representation in Parliament. This clearly illustrates the weakness o f  a 
constituency-based electoral system that allows a disproportional 
representation o f  parties.
Sekatle disagrees with the argument that the current Lesotho electoral 
system favours the exclusion of significant minorities from participating in 
the country’s political life:
I do not agree that the electoral system  deliberately  excludes certain  
sec tio n s o f  the population . It d id not do so in 1965 and 1970. In 1965 
opposition  parties w ere w ell represented  in Parliam ent. T he 1970 
elections would have also given a fair representation to opposition  parties.
T he anom aly  o f  a one party parliam ent that resulted from the 1993 and 
1998 elections is a legacy o f  the long h istory  o f  BN P dictato rsh ip . A 
po litica l party is ju d g ed  at the polls by its perform ance. I'he verdict 
passed  by the electo rate  on the BN P in 1993 and 1998 testifies to this.
You canno t rule against peo p le ’s will for m ore than tw o decades and
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expect to be forgiven inside tw o years. (1999:7)
While agreeing with Sekatle that BNP's confiscation o f power in 1970 
played against it in 1993,1 nonetheless believe that an electoral system that 
ignores the choice o f almost 40 per cent o f  the electorate is not inclusive 
enough, and needs to be reformed to accommodate significant losing 
parties. Even in the 1965 election, the exclusionist patterns were present 
in the electoral system. The BNP won only 42 per cent o f  the total valid 
votes and was entitled to over 50 per cent o f the seats while the BCP, the 
Marematlou Freedom Party (MFP) and other parties and independent 
candidates who had secured together a total of 58 per cent o f  votes were 
granted only 48 per cent of the seats (Matlosa, 1999b: 11).
Rule (1998: 18) undertook a study for the Electoral Institute o f  South 
Africa, in which he speculate about the composition o f the Lesotho 
National assembly, had Proportional Representation (PR) or a mixture of 
PR and FPTP systems been used as an electoral system for the Kingdom. 
In a situation of pure PR, the LCD would have received 50 seats (or 60.7 
per cent of the votes) and the losing parties wculd have been entitled to 30 
seats (or 39.3 per cent o f  the votes cast). In mixed systems, opposition 
parties would still have been better represented than in the constituency- 
based system.7
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Table 1: Composition o f Lesotho National Assembly using 4







M ixed option A , 40/40 split o f  
constituency and PR seats
M ixed option B: 80 constituency 
seats and 20 compensatory PR 
seats
Const PR Total Const Compensatory 
seats Total
LCD 79 50 40 25 65 79 0 79
BNP 1 20 0 10 10 1 13 14
BCP 0 9 0 4 4 0 6 6
MFP 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1
Total 80 80 40 40 80 80 20 100
Source: Rule, S: The Lesotho Election , May 1998, the Electoral
Institute o f  South Africa, Johannesburg, 1998:18.
The agreement finally reached by the Basotho politicians in the Interim 
Political authority (IPA), which includes a reform of the electoral law, has 
to be welcomed. Such a reform should, however, avoid the replacement of 
the constituency-based system by a purely PR system as the latter electoral 
system (i.e. PR) contains its own disadvantages, such as the lack o f local 
accountability o f  members o f  Parliament. A mixed electoral system 
combining the advantages of both the FTPT and PR systems would be 
advisable.
Nevertheless, it would be simplistic to hold the Lesotho electoral system 
solely responsible for what happened after the announcement o f  the May 
1998 election and the subsequent intervention by the South Africa and 
Botswana troops. The elitism and greed o f the Lesotho political class also 
contributed significantly.
The Political Elite and its Lack o f a Culture o f Tolerance
The results o f  each and every general election in Lesotho has been disputed 
either by the opposition parties or by the ruling party. In fact, in 1965 the 
BCP lost the election and protested over the results. In 1970 the ruling
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BNP cancelled the election which it had lost. After being defeated in the 
1993 parliamentary general election following the re-introduction of 
multiparty politics, the BNP challenged the results in a court o f  law. 
Finally, unprecedented levels o f  violence followed the challenge to the 
legitimacy o f  the 1998 general election by the BCP, BNP and MFP.
Why do the losing parties in Lesotho never accept the electoral outcome? 
Sekatle provides us with an explanation : “The explanation must be sought 
from politics o f  the belly. The state in developing countries is the most 
reliable source of economic power. Those who control the state machinery 
control the economy. This is why battles for the control o f  the state are 
issues o f  life and death.” (1999:6)
This explanation is echoed by Matlosa (1999a, pi 5) when he accounts for 
the roots o f the conflict within the BCP and which led to the formation of 
the LCD. “The two factions engaged in a fierce power struggle which was 
driven by neither policy nor ideological differences, but rather by leadership 
squabbles and how best to share the spoils o f  state power” . (1999a: 15)
In summary, the responsibility o f  the Lesotho political elite in the 
successive political crises that have occurred in the Kingdom is well 
documented. Most analysts acknowledge the need for political 
inclusiveness and participation. However, it must be emphasised that the 
accession to power should be based on the choice o f the electorate and not 
on the levels of violence used by the losers and their followers to force the 
door o f  power. Acceptance of defeat is part of a culture that needs to be 
built by Basotho politicians to spare their country unnecessary destruction, 
killing and political instability that could also have negative impact on the 
other countries of the region.
Conclusion
There are lessons to be drawn by the SADC with regard to the crises and 
interventions in Lesotho and the Congo. Whereas the Lesotho crisis 
occurred in the context of a dysfunctional and exclusionist electoral system, 
the roots of the DRC conflict are to be found in the undemocratic nature of 
its incumbent regime, as well as the absence o f a legitimate and inclusive 
constitutional framework. Both countries need to establish constitutional 
and electoral frameworks that ensure the rule of the majority while allowing
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significant minorities to participate meaningfully in political life.
Furthermore, the political stability o f both countries is being jeopardised by 
the tendency o f their respective political elites to advance their personal, 
rather than national, interests.
It is therefore crucial for regional leaders to make sure that conflicts are not 
fabricated by politicians to advance their quest for power, at the expense of 
human life and common interests. Mechanisms should be found not only 
to promote the emergence o f inclusive democracy, but also to identify and 
prevent elitist interests from threatening regional peace, security and 
stability. Thus, legitimate conflicts could be converted into opportunities 
for the installation o f  more stable and inclusive systems o f representation, 
which constitute some of the sine qua non requisites for the democratic 
consolidation and development o f  the region.
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